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Visual perception is strongly shaped by expectations, but it is poorly understood how
such perceptual expectations are learned in our dynamic sensory environment. Here,
we applied a Bayesian framework to investigate whether perceptual expectations are
continuously updated from different aspects of ongoing experience. In two experiments,
human observers performed an associative learning task in which rapidly changing
expectations about the appearance of ambiguous stimuli were induced. We found
that perception of ambiguous stimuli was biased by both learned associations and
previous perceptual outcomes. Computational modeling revealed that perception was
best explained by a model that continuously updated priors from associative learning
and perceptual history and combined these priors with the current sensory information
in a probabilistic manner. Our findings suggest that the construction of visual perception is
a highly dynamic process that incorporates rapidly changing expectations from different
sources in a manner consistent with Bayesian learning and inference.
Keywords: visual perception, Bayesian brain, bistable perception, associative learning, sensory memory,
hierarchical Gaussian filter
INTRODUCTION
Sensory signals are inherently noisy and ambiguous. To make sense of such information, our
perception strongly relies on expectations. For instance, when a photograph of a striped dress
is consistent with two different color interpretations, the visual system resolves this ambiguity
by using the expectation about how colors appear under common illumination conditions
(Gegenfurtner et al., 2015; Lafer-Sousa et al., 2015). Such perceptual expectations about the
appearance of a stimulus can be modified by repeated experience of the stimulus (Orbach et al.,
1963; Maier et al., 2003; Chalk et al., 2010; Fischer and Whitney, 2014) or of associated cues (Sinha
and Poggio, 1996; Ernst et al., 2000; Adams et al., 2004; Haijiang et al., 2006; Flanagan et al., 2008;
Sterzer et al., 2008; Di Luca et al., 2010; Schmack et al., 2013). However, it has remained elusive how
the visual system updates perceptual expectations moment by moment in a continuously changing
world.
A powerful theory for the study of perceptual expectations is the Bayesian brain hypothesis
(Knill and Pouget, 2004; Friston, 2005; Fiser et al., 2010; Seriès and Seitz, 2013). In this framework,
perceptual expectations are formalized as prior probabilities that are combined with likelihoods
representing sensory information by Bayes’ rule. The resulting posterior probabilities reflect the
outcome of perceptual inference about the causes of sensory inputs. In line with this idea,
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the influence of perceptual expectations on perception can be
accurately explained by Bayesian inference (Weiss et al., 2002;
Stocker and Simoncelli, 2006; Adams et al., 2010; Chalk et al.,
2010; Acerbi et al., 2012; Zhang et al., 2013). Intriguingly, the
outlined theoretical framework can also elegantly account for
the update of perceptual expectations on the basis of ongoing
perceptual experience: whenever a perceptual outcome deviates
from a perceptual expectation, the resulting mismatch between
the posterior and prior probability will trigger an update of
the perceptual expectation. Thus, the Bayesian brain hypothesis
affords a comprehensive mechanistic model not only for the
influence of perceptual expectations on perceptual experience
(inference) but also conversely for the influence of perceptual
experience on perceptual expectations (learning).
Here, we applied the outlined Bayesian framework to
investigate how perceptual inference is modulated by continuous
learning from ongoing perceptual experience. To concurrently
examine inference and learning, we devised a novel task
using ambiguous and unambiguous visual motion stimuli in
combination with audio-visual associative learning. Our task
design allowed us to assess perceptual expectations based on
perceptual history, i.e., previous perceptual outcomes, and
associative learning, i.e., changing audio-visual contingencies.
By the use of computational modeling, we quantified trial-by-
trial learning of these perceptual expectations and the effect
of these perceptual expectations in perceptual inference. We
hypothesized to find evidence for a continuous integration
of different sources of experience in the moment-to-moment
updating of perceptual expectations, thus resulting in the flexible
adaptation of perceptual inference to dynamic changes in the
environment.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Participants that were included into analyses were capable of
stereopsis and of perceiving the ambiguous sphere stimulus
in both possible configurations (see below). Experiment 1 was
completed by 31 participants (age range 19–61 years, age median
25 years, 19 female). Experiment 2 was completed by 31
participants who had not participated in Experiment 1 (age range
20–33 years, median 24 years, 20 female). All participants of both
experiments were naive as to the purpose of the study. All of them
had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. All participants gave
written informed consent in accordance with the Declaration of
Helsinki beforehand, and the experiments were approved by the
ethics committee of Charité - Universitätsmedizin Berlin.
General Method
Participants performed an associative reversal learning task in
which different kinds of rapidly changing expectations about the
appearance of an ambiguous stimulus were induced (Figure 1,
see below). High or low tones were associated with leftward
or rightward rotation of a subsequently presented visual sphere
stimulus. On learning trials, the direction of rotation was
determined by disparity cues that yielded an unambiguous
3D appearance of the rotating sphere. The association of
FIGURE 1 | Schematic illustration of experimental design. Participants
performed an probabilistic reversal learning task in which tones were coupled
to the rotation direction of a sphere stimulus. On unambiguous learning trials,
the direction of rotation was unambigiously determined by 3D disparity cues.
The association between tones and rotation direction was probabilistic and
changed unpredictably every 16–32 trials. On interspersed ambiguous test
trials, the sphere stimulus was perceptually very similar to the one in the
training trials but lacked 3D disparity cues and could therefore be perceived
either in one or the other rotation direction. After each trial, participants
indicated the perceived rotation direction as quickly and accurately as
possible, and reported their confidence about the percept.
tones with rotation directions was probabilistic and changed
unpredictably every 16–32 trials. Pseudo-randomly interspersed
were test trials, on which the sphere lacked disparity cues
and was thus ambiguous with respect to rotation direction,
but indistinguishable in appearance from the unambiguous 3D
stimulus. After each trial, participants indicated the perceived
rotation direction as quickly and accurately as possible, and
reported their confidence about the percept. Visual and auditory
stimuli were produced using Matlab (MathWorks Inc.) and
Cogent 2000 toolbox (http://www.vislab.ucl.ac.uk/cogent.php).
Visual stimuli were presented on a on a CRT monitor (1024 ×
768 pixels resolution, 60 Hz frame rate). In order to produce
stereoscopic vision in the unambiguous training trials (see
below), all stimuli were displayed dichoptically through a mirror
stereoscope.
Experiment 1
Trials started with the presentation of either a high-pitched
or a low-pitched tone (500 or 1250 Hz, duration 0.3 s) and
a black screen with a central white fixation cross. After a
variable interval (0.1–0.3 s), a sphere appeared (diameter 10.6◦
of visual angle). The sphere rotated along a vertical axis at
1/15 Hz. It consisted of 450 randomly distributed yellow square
“dots” (maximum size 0.2◦ × 0.2◦) moving coherently left- or
rightward on a black background with a central fixation cross.
In training trials, the sphere contained interocular disparity
cues (maximal offset 0.5◦) that were induced with a mirror
stereoscope, thereby rendering rotation direction unambiguous.
In test trials, the sphere was shown without disparity cues
and rotation direction was therefore ambiguous. For naive
observers, the ambiguous and the unambiguous sphere are
nearly indistinguishable in appearance. In all trials, the sphere
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was displayed until participants indicated the perceived rotation
direction (left or right) by pressing a key on a computer keyboard
(left arrow or right arrow, respectively). After the presentation
of a blank screen for 0.4 s, participants reported their confidence
about their decision (very sure, sure, unsure, very unsure). After
an interval jittered between 0.35 and 1.65 s the next trial started.
On every trial, we recorded the perceived rotation direction (left
or right), the reaction time for this response, as well as the
confidence rating (very sure, sure, unsure, very unsure).
Participants performed a total of 576 trials divided in six runs.
Tones and rotation directions were associated probabilistically,
and the association was reversed between trial blocks consisting
of 16, 24, or 32 trials (see Figure 1). In half of the trial blocks,
75% of all trials were unambiguous training trials in which
the high-pitch tone was followed by a left-ward rotating sphere
(and a low-pitch tone by right-ward rotating sphere), and 12.5%
of the trials were unambiguous training trials the high-pitch
tone was followed by a right-ward rotating sphere (and a low-
pitch tone by left-ward rotating sphere). In the other half of
trial blocks, unambiguous training trials were presented with
reversed associations. In all trial blocks, 12.5% of the trials were
test trials during which both high-pitch and low-pitch tones
were followed by a sphere stimulus with ambiguous rotation
direction. Participants were told that the relation between tones
and rotation direction was probabilistic and that this probabilistic
relation would change unpredictably over time. They were not
informed about the intervals over which the probabilistic relation
changed or about the occurrence of ambiguous stimuli. Trial
order was pseudo-randomized, ensuring that ambiguous test
trials were preceded by at least three unambiguous training trials
with the currently more probable tone-rotation association.
Two additional individuals that had performed Experiment
1 were not included into analyses because their performance in
the discrimination of the unambiguous cues was at chance level
indicating impaired stereopsis. Another additional individual
that had performed Experiment 1 was not included into analyses
due to always seeing the ambiguous sphere rotating in the same
direction indicating that this individual might not have been
capable of perceiving the ambiguous stimulus in both possible
configurations.
Experiment 2
In Experiment 1, the task was kept as easy as possible and a
fixed mapping between the key presses and perceived rotation
direction was used throughout the whole experiment, i.e.,
participants always indicated “right” with the right arrow key
and “left” with the left arrow key. This raises the possibility
that any observed effects of perceptual expectations on reported
perception partly reflect a bias in key pressing behavior rather
than a bias in perceptual inference. To rule out this possibility, we
conducted a second experiment in which participants’ key presses
were uncorrelated with their perception. Please note that this
experimental manipulation comes at the cost of increased task
demands with possibly increased error rates and noisier response
speeds.
The design of Experiment 2 closely resembled the design of
Experiment 1 with the following exception. When the sphere
appeared, participants judged the perceived rotation direction in
mind and pressed the space bar on a keyboard as soon as they
had made their decision. Then, two symbols were displayed next
to each other, one pointing to the left and one pointing to the
right. The task was to indicate whether the symbol displayed
at the right or the symbol at the left matched the perceived
rotation direction by pressing the right arrow key or the left
arrow key, respectively. The position of the symbols was pseudo-
randomized so that the left arrow key corresponded to left
rotation direction in half of the trials and to right rotation
direction in the other half of the trials. After participants had
made their choice, the trial proceeded as in Experiment 1 with
the confidence rating. On every trial, we recorded the reaction
time for the space bar press indicating that the participant had
made a decision, perceived rotation direction (left or right)
as well as the confidence rating (very sure, sure, unsure, very
unsure).
One additional individual that had performed Experiment
2 was not included into analyses because the individual’s
performance in the discrimination of the unambiguous cues was
at chance level indicating impaired stereopsis. Two additional
individuals that had performed Experiment 2 were not included
into analyses due to always seeing the ambiguous sphere rotating
in the same direction indicating that these individuals might not
have been capable of perceiving the ambiguous stimulus in both
possible configurations.
Measurement of Perceptual Biases
The measurement of expectation-induced perceptual biases
was based on the perceptual assessment of the ambiguous
figures. To derive these perceptual biases, we defined distinct
perceptual expectations from the sources associative learning
and perceptual history for each ambiguous test trial. For
associative learning, the current perceptual expectation was
determined by the pitch of the tone and the currently
predominant association, i.e., in phases of the experiment
during which high-pitch tones was followed by a rightward
rotation direction in 75% of the trials, we assumed that on
a trial that started with a high-pitch tone rightward rotation
direction was expected. Please note that on ambiguous test
trials the currently predominant association was equivalent to
the recently experienced association, as our task design ensured
that each ambiguous test trial was preceded by at least three
unambiguous training trials matching the currently predominant
association (see Methods, Experiment 1). For perceptual history,
we followed the previously formulated distinction between the
perceptual effects of previous unambiguous visual stimulation
(“priming”) and previous ambiguous visual stimulation (“sensory
memory”; Pearson and Brascamp, 2008). For priming, the
current perceptual expectation was set equal to the perceived
rotation direction in the unambiguous trial that directly
preceded the ambiguous trial, i.e., after an unambiguous trial
with a rightward rotating sphere stimulus, we assumed that
rightward rotation was expected. For sensory memory, the
current perceptual expectation was defined by the perceived
rotation direction in the last ambiguous trial, i.e., after an
ambiguous trial in which rightward rotation was perceived, we
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assumed that on the next ambiguous trial rightward rotation
was expected. Please note that the factor associative learning
describes the coupling between tones and perceptual outcomes
(the contingency level), whereas priming and sensory memory
are defined by the perceptual outcomes alone (the perceptual
level). As a consequence, the perceptual expectations induced
by “associative learning” and by “priming” are orthogonal to
each other. For any of the perceptual expectations (associative
learning, priming, or sensory memory), the magnitude of the
perceptual bias was then calculated as the difference between the
percentage of ambiguous trials in which rotation direction was
perceived in congruence with the current perceptual expectation
and the percentage of ambiguous trials in which rotation
direction was perceived in incongruence with the current
perceptual expectation.
To further characterize the nature of the perceptual bias
induced by associative learning, we calculated the number of
trials that were rated at the highest of the four confidence levels
(“very sure”), and repeated the analysis of the perceptual bias
induced by associative learning for only these high-confidence
trials. Moreover, we conducted a two-way ANOVA that tested
for the effects of stimulus type (“ambiguous” vs. “unambiguous”)
and associative learning (“congruent” vs. “incongruent”) on the
number of high-confidence trials.
We further aimed to relate the perceptual bias induced
by associative learning to the effect of associative learning
on motor response speed. Specifically, we assumed that on
unambiguous training trials participants would respond faster
if they had predicted the upcoming perceived direction of
rotation, and that such motor adaptation would constitute an
indirect measure of associative learning. We hypothesized that
participants with stronger motor adaptation in unambiguous
training trials would also exhibit a stronger perceptual bias
in ambiguous test trials. To quantify the motor adaptation
induced by associative learning, we calculated the difference
in mean reaction times between unambiguous trials that were
congruent with the expectation induced by associative learning
and that were incongruent with the expectation induced by
associative learning. In order to correct for individual differences
in absolute reaction times, this difference was divided by
the mean reaction times in all unambiguous trials. Please
note that as a result of this normalization procedure the
motor adaptation measure does not have a unit. In both
experiments reaction times were defined by the key press that
indicated that participants had made their perceptual choice,
i.e., in Experiment 1 by presses of the left arrow or right
arrow key and in Experiment 2 by presses of the space
bar.
To verify that participants’ changing expectations induced by
associative learning had an effect on perception independently
from priming and sensory memory, we conducted a trial-
wise repeated measures logistic regression. A generalized linear
model was fitted to the binary dependent variable coding
perceptual outcomes. The model included three regressors
of interest coding the binary perceptual expectations from
associative learning, priming, and sensory memory. The model
specification assumed a Poisson distribution for the binary
predictors, and a log link function relating perceptual outcomes
to a linear combination of the predictors. Statistical significance
of the betas of each of the regressors was assessed by the
Wald-Chi-square test. Following the recommendation of one
of our reviewers, we compared the full model including all
three regressors with reduced models that lacked one or two
of the regressors in order to further assess whether associative
learning, priming and sensory memory had independent effects
on perception. To this end, model fit was quantified by the quasi-
likelihood under independence criterion (QIC) as implemented
in SPSS.
For all statistical analyses we used the Statistics Toolbox
of Matlab (MathWorks Inc.) with exception of the trial-wise
repeated measures logistic regression that was conducted in
SPSS (IBM SPSS Statistics, Version 23.0.0.0). Prior to analysis,
incorrect or missed responses were excluded. Please note that by
definition there were no incorrect responses on ambiguous test
trials. For experiment 1, on average 1.6 ± 0.4 (mean ± s.e.m)
trials were excluded per participant. For experiment 2, on average
0.8± 0.2 (mean± s.e.m) trials were excluded per participant.
Bayesian Modeling
In our experiments, participants did not have direct access to
the hidden contingency between tones and perceptual outcomes
and had to infer the association over time. Using the currently
predominant association (hidden contingency) in the logistic
regression model thus constitutes a simplification. We therefore
adopted a computational approach that specifically addresses
this problem by explicitly modeling the individuals’ belief
trajectory about this hidden contingency in order to generate
trial-by-trial perceptual expectations induced by associative
learning. To enable the integration of perceptual expectations
induced by associative learning with perceptual expectations
based on perceptual history, we used a Bayesian framework
that frames perception as an inferential processes in which
perceptual decisions are based on posterior distributions.
According to Bayes’ rule, such posterior distributions are
derived from likelihood distributions representing the sensory
information, and prior distributions, which—in the context
of this experiment—can be used to formalize expectations
about perceptual outcomes. Crucially, such priors can stem
from different sources: “priming” (the influence of a visual
percept on the subsequent trial) and “sensory memory” (the
influence of the visual percept in an ambiguous trial on
the subsequent ambiguous trial) can be framed as priors for
visual perception that are derived from perceptual history.
Furthermore, such priors can be constructed by “associative
learning,” i.e., the participants’ continuously updated belief
about the probabilistic coupling between tones and visual
stimuli. All priors can be modeled by Gaussian probability
distributions which are defined by their respective mean
and precision (the inverse of variance). Importantly, the
precision term represents the impact of a prior on the
posterior distribution and thus relates to its influence on visual
perception.
The modeling analysis presented here (see Figure 3 for a
schematic overview) was based on the prediction of perceptual
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outcomes, i.e., on the perception of left- or rightward rotation,
from specific prior distributions and the likelihood. In brief,
the prior distributions “associative learning,” “priming,” and
“sensory memory” were parametrized by means (µ) and
precisions (pi). The prior distribution “associative learning”
(µa and pia) was defined by an ideal Bayesian learner that
is derived by a Hierarchical Gaussian Filter (HGF, Mathys
et al., 2014, HGF 4.0 toolbox, www.translationalneuromodeling.
org). The prior distributions “priming” (µp and pip) and
“sensory memory” (pis and µs) were defined by the respective
perceptual history. The prior distributions were computed
into a joint prior distribution (µprior and piprior). In order
to determine which prior distributions influence perceptual
outcomes, different models including all possible combinations
of the prior distributions “associative learning,” “priming,”
and “sensory memory” were compared by Bayesian model
selection.
On each trial, an ambiguous or unambiguous visual stimulus
was presented which could be perceived as rotating either right-
or leftwards. These two alternative visual percepts were given by:
θ =
{
1: → (rotation)
0: ← (rotation)
(1)
To formalize the sensory information on both ambiguous and
unambiguous trials, we constructed a likelihood by combining a
a fixed bimodal distribution (Sundareswara and Schrater, 2008)
with a distribution reflecting the stereodisparity between the
monocular channels that disambiguated the visual spheres. The
mean of the distribution “stereodisparity” in trial t was defined
by stereodisparity between the two eyes in trial t:
µstereo(t)


1: → (disambiguation)
0.5: ↔ (ambiguous)
0: ← (disambiguation)
(2)
In order to define the prior distribution “associative learning,”
we defined by an ideal Bayesian learner by using HGF for
binary inputs without perceptual uncertainty (Mathys et al.,
2014), as implemented in the HGF 4.0 toolbox (distributed
within the TAPAS toolbox, www.translationalneuromodeling.
org). Importantly, we used the HGF on contingencies between
tones and rotation directions and not on rotation directions
per se. The HGF therefore represented a model of optimal
higher-order learning of changing contingencies. In an initial
step, we estimated the parameters of the HGF by inverting
this generative model based on the stimulus sequence alone,
under default assumptions of the HGF. In other words,
we determined those parameter values under which the
stimulus sequence was least surprising, given the belief
trajectories of the HGF. This yielded an ideal Bayesian
learner accounting for the associative learning effects in our
paradigm; the ensuing trial-wise predictions were integrated
with predictions from other sources (“priming,” “sensory
memory”) into a Bayesian model of behavior described
below.
The contingencies emerging from the probabilistic coupling
of tones and rotations were defined as follows:
Inputs =


1 for ↑ (tone) + ← (rotation)
1 for ↓ (tone) + → (rotation)
0 for ↑ (tone) + → (rotation)
0 for ↓ (tone) + ← (rotation)
(3)
The mean of the prior distribution “associative learning” on trial
t was defined by:
µa(t) =
{
µˆ1(t): for ↓ (tone)
1− µˆ1(t): for ↑ (tone)
(4)
The mean of the prior distribution “priming” on trial t was
defined by the visual percept on the preceding trial:
µp(t) = θ(t − 1) (5)
The mean of the prior distribution “sensory memory” on trial t
was defined by the visual percept on the preceding ambiguous
trial ta:
µs(t) = θ(ta) (6)
In order to predict the perceptual outcomes, we derived
the posterior distribution with respect to left- or rightward-
rotation from the model. This distribution results from
a “stereodisparity”-weighted bimodal likelihood distribution
(Sundareswara and Schrater, 2008) by a combination of prior
distributions such as “associative learning,” “priming,” and
“sensory memory.”
For a specific combination of these prior distribution, a joint
prior distribution with mean µprior and precision piprior can be
calculated by adding up the means of influencing factors relative
to their respective precision:
µprior =
piaµa + pipµp + pisµs
piprior
(7)
piprior = pia + pip + pis (8)
To derive the posterior distribution, this joint prior distribution
is combined with the likelihood. To this end, the joint prior
distribution (parametrized byµprior and piprior) is used along with
the the “stereodisparity” information of the bimodal likelihood
distribution (parametrized by µstereo and pistereo) to adjust the
probability ratio r of percept θ1 and θ2 in a bimodal distribution
(Sundareswara and Schrater, 2008):
µm =
pipriorµprior + pistereoµstereo
pim
(9)
pim = piprior + pistereo (10)
r =
P(θ1)
P(θ2)
= exp(
(θ1 − µm)
2 − (θ2 − µm)
2
pi−2w
) (11)
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P(θ1) =
1
r + 1
(12)
Note that whether the prior distributions (parametrized by
µprior and piprior) and the stereodisparity information of the
likelihood (parametrized by µstereo and pistereo) are integrated
at once or sequentially cannot be disentangled based on the
model presented here, since both scenarios are mathematically
equivalent, hence leading to identical posterior distributions and
identical predictions of behavior.
The predicted response y of the subjects is given by applying a
unit sigmoid function with ζ = 1 to P(θ1):
y =
P(θ1)
ζ
P(θ1)ζ + (1− P(θ1))ζ
(13)
In order to determine which prior distributions influenced
perceptual outcomes, we first constructed models incorporating
all combinations of the prior distributions “associative learning,”
“priming,” and “sensory memory.” To this end, the precisions of
these distributions were either estimated as free parameters in the
perceptual model or fixed at zero (thereby effectively removing a
prior distribution from themodel). Furthermore, the precision of
the likelihood-weighing distribution “stereodisparity” was always
estimated as a free parameter. Thus, this yielded 23 = 8 models.
After identifying the optimal model using Bayesian model
selection, we extracted its posterior parameters with regard to the
respective precision of the prior distributions, and related them
to the behavioral measures. Crucially, we calculated the Pearson’s
correlation coefficient for the relationship between pia encoding
the precision of the prior distribution “associative learning” and
the behavioral perceptual bias induced by associative learning.
We employed a Variational Bayesian model inversion in order
to estimate the free parameters of the model. This procedure
determines the posterior distributions over parameters by
maximizing the log-model evidences. This translates onto the
negative surprise about an individual subject’s data on the
background of a specific model, and is approximated by negative
free energy (Friston and Stephan, 2007). As an optimization
algorithm, we chose the quasi-Newton Broyden-Fletcher-
Goldfarb-Shanno minimization algorithm, as implemented in
the HGF 4.0 toolbox. For model inversion, the prior distributions
for the free parameters (not to be confounded with the prior
distributions in the perceptual model) were modeled as log-
normal distributions. The parameters pia, pip, and pis were
included into a model by setting the respective prior mean
to log(0.5) and the prior variance to 1. To exclude any of
the parameters pia, pip, and pis from a model, the respective
prior mean was fixed to log(0) by setting the prior variance
to 0. The parameter pistereo was always estimated with a
prior mean of log(2.5) and a prior variance of 1. All other
parameters were fixed and were set to: µ2 = 0, µ3 =
0, ρ2 = 0, κ2 = 1, ω2 = −2.28, ω3 = −6.14,
ζ = 1.
Following the suggestion of one of our reviewers, we repeated
the Bayesian modeling analyses with an alternative formulation
of the prior distribution “associative learning,” and replaced the
ideal Bayesian learner by Bayesian learning models that were
fitted to the individuals’ behavior. To this end, the parameters
that control the time-invariant component of the learning rate
at the second and third level were estimated as additional free
parameters: ω2 (prior mean: -2.28, prior variance: 1) and ω3
(prior mean: -6.13, prior variance: 1). All other parameters were
kept free or fixed as described above. This alternative formulation
of the prior distribution “associative learning” allowed us to
generate belief trajectories that take into consideration inter-
individual differences in learning rate.
RESULTS
Experiment 1: Expectation-Induced
Perceptual Biases
We first examined whether perceptual history, i.e., the previous
experience of the visual sphere stimuli had an impact on
perception. In line with previous work (Pearson and Brascamp,
2008), we found perception on the ambiguous test trials to
be biased toward the rotation direction of both the preceding
unambiguous training trial (“priming,” 28.7% ± 3.9 s.e.m.,
difference between percentages of trials perceived in same and
opposite direction, t(30) = 7.37, p < 0.001, one-sample t-
test, Figure 2A) and the preceding ambiguous trial (“sensory
memory,” 45.1%± 4.9 s.e.m., t(30) = 9.19, p < 0.001, Figure 2A).
Thus, the qualitative perception of the ambiguous sphere stimuli
strongly depended on previous perceptual outcomes, indicating
that perceptual expectations substantially contribute to resolve
ambiguity in visual information and are flexibly updated by
perceptual history.
Next and most importantly, we tested whether the rapidly
changing contingencies between tones and visual sphere stimuli
affected perception. Notably, ambiguous test trials stimuli were
perceived more frequently as rotating in the direction consistent
with the currently predominant association than in the direction
inconsistent with this association (“associative learning,” 5.4%
± 1.7 s.e.m., t(30) = 3.23, p = 0.003, Figure 2A), and the
size of this effect corresponded to an intermediate to strong
effect (Cohen’s d = 0.6). To investigate whether this effect of
associative learning was due to a generally lower confidence
in the perception of ambiguous stimuli, we analyzed the
confidence rating data in a two-way ANOVA (Supplementary
Figure S1). This analysis revealed a main effect of stimulus type
on confidence ratings, indicating that on ambiguous test trials
compared to unambiguous training trials participants indicated
less frequently the highest confidence level (F = 11.9, p= 0.002).
There were no main effect of associative learning (F = 1.6, p =
0.22) nor an interaction between stimulus type and associative
learning (F = 0.4, p = 0.55). Despite the main effect of stimulus
type, participants still rated more than 75% of the ambiguous
test trials at the highest confidence level (Supplementary Figure
S1), suggesting that the vast majority of ambiguous test trials
was perceptually indistinguishable from unambiguous test trials.
Most importantly, when considering only these high-confidence
ambiguous test trials, we still found that stimuli were perceived
more frequently as rotating in the direction consistent with
the currently predominant association than in the direction
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FIGURE 2 | Results from Experiment 1 and Experiment 2. (A,C) Effect of perceptual expectations on visual perception (mean ± s.e.m.). Perceptual biases
quantify the influence of perceptual expectations from associative learning, priming or memory on perception in ambiguous test trials. P-values result from one-sample
t-tests. Please note that the influence of associative learning corresponds to effects of intermediate size (all Cohen’s d >0.5). (B,D) Correlation across participants
between perceptual bias and motor adaptation for associative learning. Motor adaptation describes the effect of associative learning on reaction times in
unambiguous training trials. Each dot represents one participant; the dashed line illustrates the fitted regression line; r- and p-values result from Pearson’s
product-moment correlations.
inconsistent with this association (6.9%± 2.7 s.e.m., t(30) = 2.57,
p = 0.015, Cohen’s d = 0.5, Figure 2A). Thus, our results so
far suggest that perception of the ambiguous sphere stimuli was
biased by the changing contingencies, indicating that perceptual
expectations are rapidly updated by associative learning and are
used in perceptual inference.
To further corroborate the influence of associative learning on
perception, we investigated an independent measure of learning,
motor response speeds, and how this measure related to the
observed changes in perception.We found that on unambiguous
training trials, participants responded faster to sphere stimuli
matching the currently predominant association than to stimuli
not matching this association [613 vs. 642 ms ± 5 s.e.m,
normalized difference −4.9 % ± 0.9 s.e.m., t(30) = −5.40,
p < 0.001], confirming that participants successfully tracked
the changing associations and adapted their motor responses
accordingly (den Ouden et al., 2010). Remarkably, across
individuals the motor adaptation effect on unambiguous trials
correlated with the perceptual bias on ambiguous trials (r = 0.42,
p = 0.019, Pearson’s product-moment correlation, Figure 2B).
This result indicates a direct relationship between the effect of
associative learning on motor response speeds and its influence
on perception, suggesting that perceptual expectations induced
by rapid associative learning indeed affect perceptual inference.
To verify that associative learning had an effect on perception
independently from perceptual history, we conducted a trial-
wise repeated measures logistic regression that included three
regressors coding the expectations based on associative learning,
priming, and sensory memory. This analysis revealed that
all three regressors significantly predicted perception in the
ambiguous test trials (“priming” b = 0.61 ± 0.10, Wald Chi-
Square 36.4, p < 0.001; “sensory memory” b= 0.34± 0.07, Wald
Chi-Square 26.2 p < 0.001, “associative learning” b= 0.11± 0.03,
Wald Chi-Square 17.1, p < 0.001), indicating that associative
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learning impacted on the appearance of the ambiguous sphere
stimuli despite the strong effects of perceptual history. Moreover,
the full logistic regression with all three regressors compared to
reduced logistic regressions with only two or one regressors was
associated with lower QIC–value and hence better model fit (see
Supplementary Table S1), further suggesting additive effects of
associative learning, priming, and sensory memory.
Experiment 2: Expectation-Induced
Perceptual Biases
To further establish that perceptual expectations influenced
perceptual inference from visual information rather than
merely biasing participants’ reporting behavior, we conducted
Experiment 2 where we dissociated participants’ perception from
their key presses by the use of a variable stimulus-response
mapping. We again found perception in ambiguous test trials
to be biased toward the rotation direction of the preceding
unambiguous training trial [“priming,” 39.6%± 3.9 s.e.m., t(30) =
10.10, p < 0.001, Figure 2C] and the preceding ambiguous test
trial [“sensory memory,” 28.2% ± 4.6 s.e.m., t(30) = 6.12, p
< 0.001, Figure 2C]. Most critically and replicating our central
finding of Experiment 1, in ambiguous test trials stimuli were
perceived more frequently as rotating in the direction consistent
with the currently predominant association than in the direction
inconsistent with this association [6.2%± 2.4 s.e.m., t(30) = 2.59,
p = 0.015, Figure 2C], and this effect was of intermediate size
(Cohen’s d = 0.5).
Again, we conducted a two-way ANOVA on the confidence
rating data to test whether the found effect of associative
learning on perception was due to a generally lower confidence
in the perception of ambiguous stimuli (Supplementary Figure
S2). This analysis revealed a main effect of stimulus type on
confidence ratings, indicating that on ambiguous test trials
compared to unambiguous training trials participants indicated
less frequently the highest confidence level (F = 17.5, p <
0.001). There was also a main effect of associative learning (F
= 5.1, p = 0.03), but no interaction between stimulus type and
associative learning (F < 0.1, p = 0.98). The number of high-
confidence rating trials was generally lower in Experiment 2
than in Experiment 1 (Supplementary Figure S2), which might
be a result of the higher task demands associated with the
variable stimulus-response mapping. However, participants still
perceived the majority (more than 55%) of the ambiguous test
trials at the highest confidence level (Supplementary Figure S1).
Crucially, when including only test trials rated at the highest
confidence level were included, learned associations still biased
perceived rotation direction of the ambiguous stimuli (17.1%
± 6.2 s.e.m., t(29) = 2.74, p = 0.011, one participant was
excluded from this analysis because of not having rated any
of the ambiguous test trials at the highest confidence level,
Figure 2C).
Due to the higher task demands associated with the variable
stimulus-response mapping we expected reaction times less likely
to directly reflect associative learning. Nevertheless, we again
observed an effect of associative learning on motor adaptation:
in unambiguous trials participants were faster in making their
perceptual decision about sphere stimuli matching the currently
predominant association than to stimuli not matching this
association (795 vs. 816 ms, normalized difference −2.5 % ±
1.1 s.e.m, t(30) = −2.28, p = 0.030). Furthermore, there
was a trend-wise correlation between the motor adaptation
effect in unambiguous trials and the perceptual bias in
ambiguous trials (r= 0.32, p= 0.075, Pearson’s product-moment
correlation, Figure 2D), corroborating the effect of rapidly
changing perceptual expectations on perceptual inference.
As in Experiment 1, we used a repeated measures logistic
regression to probe whether associative learning had an effect on
perception independently from perceptual history. This analysis
revealed that the effect of associative learning was present despite
strong effects of perceptual history (“priming” b = 0.85 ±
0.11, Wald Chi-Square 60.0, p < 0.001; “sensory memory” b
= 0.22 ± 0.04, Wald Chi-Square 27.8, p < 0.001, “associative
learning” b = 0.10 ± 0.05,Wald Chi-Square 4.5, p < 0.034).
Again, the full logistic regression with all three regressors
compared to reduced logistic regressions with only two or one
regressors was associated with a lower QIC–value and hence
better model fit (see Supplementary Table S1). As key presses
and perception were uncorrelated, these results indicate that
perceptual expectations indeed influenced the perception of the
ambiguous stimuli, rather than only biasing the participants’
reporting behavior. This confirms that perceptual expectations
used in perceptual inference dynamically change over time in
response to both previous perceptual outcomes and associative
context.
Bayesian Modeling of Learning and
Inference
Our findings so far indicate that different aspects of prior
experience such as perceptual history or associative context are
flexibly used for the construction of visual perception, suggesting
that perceptual expectations are continuously updated from
different dynamic sources of information. In order to elucidate
the underlying mechanisms, we applied a generic Bayesian
model of learning and inference that rested on the trial-by-
trial prediction of perceptual decisions (i.e., left- or rightward
rotation) from posterior distributions (Figure 3). For every trial,
these posterior distributions were derived by inference from
likelihoods representing the ambiguous or unambiguous sensory
information by weighted bimodal distributions (Sundareswara
and Schrater, 2008) and prior distributions reflecting current
perceptual expectations about perceptual outcomes (i.e., left-
or rightward rotation) by unimodal distributions. Crucially,
the influence of different dynamic aspects of prior experience
on perceptual expectations was modeled by distinct prior
distributions for “associative learning,” “priming,” or “sensory
memory” that were separately updated on a trial-by-trial basis by
learning (Mathys et al., 2011).
To investigate which dynamic aspects of prior experience
would be incorporated into perceptual expectations and hence
impact on perceptual inference, we constructed different models
with any possible combination of the prior distributions
“associative learning,” “priming,” or “sensory memory,”
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FIGURE 3 | Schematic overview of modeling analysis. Left Panel: Perceptual and response model of modeling analysis. The perceptual model computes the
means µa , µp and µs and precisions pia, pip, pis of the prior distributions “associative learning,” “priming,” and “sensory memory.” These are computed into a joint
prior distribution with the mean µprior and piprior . Taking the stereodisparity information of the likelihood distribution into account (µstereo and pistereo), θ is derived to
predict the responses y. pia, pip, pis and pistereo constitute the free parameters of the model. All other parameters are fixed to optimal values. Right Panel: Exemplary
distributions for the prior distributions, stereodisparity information of the likelihood and resulting posterior distribution.
and compared them by random-effects Bayesian model
selection. Consistent with our results so far, the model that
included all three prior distributions was identified as a
clear winning model in both Experiment 1 (exceedance
probability 92.4%, Figure 4A) and Experiment 2 (exceedance
probability 84.2%, Figure 4B), showing that a Bayesian model
in which perceptual expectations were continuously updated
from both associative context and perceptual history best
explained participant’s perceptual decisions. Qualitatively
similar results were obtained when repeating the Bayesian
modeling analysis with an alternative formulation of the prior
distribution “associative learning” that took into consideration
inter-individual differences in learning rate (Experiment 1:
exceedance probability; Experiment 2: exceedance probability
89.6%; Supplementary Figure S3). To further examine the
explanatory power of the winning model, we extracted the
parameter encoding the precision of the prior distribution
“associative learning” (pia) which we expected to reflect the
impact of associative learning on perception. In line with this,
we found a significant correlation across participants between
this model parameter pia with the participants’ perceptual
biases induced by associative learning from both Experiment
1 (r = 0.49, p = 0.005, Pearson’s correlation, Figure 4C)
and Experiment 2 (r = 0.58, p < 0.001, Figure 4D). Taken
together, these results indicate a role of associative learning in
addition to perceptual history in the continuous adaptation
of perceptual expectations, suggesting that different aspects of
prior experience are used to resolve perceptual ambiguity in
a synergistic manner consistent with Bayesian learning and
inference.
DISCUSSION
Our current results demonstrate that perceptual expectations
strongly influence the perception of an ambiguous stimulus and
that these expectations are shaped by fast associative learning
as well as by perceptual history. Importantly, the influence
of fast associative learning on perception had an intermediate
effect size and was even present when participants were highly
confident about their perception. Most critically, we show that
perception of the ambiguous stimulus is best explained by a
Bayesian model that continuously updates priors from both
associative learning and perceptual history and combines them
with the current sensory information in a probabilistic manner.
Our current findings thus provide striking evidence that visual
perception continuously incorporates different dynamic aspects
of prior experience in a highly flexible manner consistent with
Bayesian learning and inference, thereby offering a mechanistic
explanation of how perceptual inference deals with the volatility
of the environment.
The idea that previous experience influences on perception
dates back to von Helmholtz (1867), and has lead to the
notion perception does not reflect objective features of the
environment but rather biological utility based on previous
experience (Purves et al., 2015). In accordance with this,
the mere experience of a stimulus improves or accelerates
subsequent identification or detection of this stimulus (Schacter
and Buckner, 1998), showing that perceptual history influences
perceptual performance. Moreover, previous experience can also
bias the appearance of both unambiguous stimuli (Fischer and
Whitney, 2014) and ambiguous stimuli (Orbach et al., 1963;
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FIGURE 4 | Modeling results from Experiment 1 and 2. (A,C) Results of model comparison. The model names at the y axis specify eight models with all possible
combinations of the prior distributions “associative learning” (A), “priming” (P) and “sensory memory” (S), where “+” means that the corresponding prior distribution
was included and “−” means that the corresponding prior distribution was excluded. Exceedance probabilities were derived by random-effects Bayesian model
selection as implemented in SPM8. Exceedance probability refers to the probability that a model is more likely, at the group level, than any other model considered. In
both experiments, the model +A+P+S including all prior distributions clearly outperformed all other models that lacked one, two or all of the prior distributions. (B,D)
Correlation between model parameters and behavior. The posterior parameter estimates for the precision of the prior distribution “associative learning” from the
winning model +A+P+S is correlated across participants with the perceptual bias induced by associative learning. Each dot represents one participant; the dashed
line illustrates the fitted regression line; r- and p-values result from Pearson’s product-moment correlations.
Maier et al., 2003), indicating an impact of perceptual history
on the contents of perception. In this context, it is noteworthy
that the appearance of ambiguous stimuli has been shown to
be influenced by both prior experience evoked by the same
ambiguous stimuli (“sensory memory”) as well as by prior
experience of unambiguous versions of the ambiguous stimuli
(“priming,” see Pearson and Brascamp, 2008 for a review). Our
current results confirm the described effects of “priming” and
“sensorymemory” on the appearance of ambiguous stimuli. Most
importantly, however, we formalized “priming” and “sensory
memory” as continuously updated priors in the framework of
Bayesian learning and inference, and found that a computational
model that included both types of perceptual history best
explained participants’ perception. We therefore suggest that
different types of perceptual history are at least in part separately
built up and synergistically used to resolve perceptual ambiguity
in a probabilistic fashion. This is in line with recent work showing
independent effects of attentional priming and sensory memory
on the perception of ambiguous stimuli (Brinkhuis et al., 2015).
It is well–established that in order to construct perception
the visual system also relies on associative context. For example,
when the shading of an object is consistent with two different
shape interpretations, the visual system resolves this ambiguity
by using the learned expectation that light usually comes
from above (Sun and Perona, 1998). In this context, it is
often implicitly assumed that perceptual expectations based
on associative context are learned slowly across development
until becoming hard-wired and fixed. Therefore, the question
how such perceptual expectations adapt to the changing
features of a dynamic environment has attracted interest only
relatively recently. In this vein, recent studies have indicated
that perceptual expectations can be modified through exposure
to new statistical contingencies in the environment (Ernst
et al., 2000; Adams et al., 2004; Flanagan et al., 2008; Chalk
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et al., 2010; Sotiropoulos et al., 2011), or placebo-like learning
(Sterzer et al., 2008; Schmack et al., 2013), raising the idea
that perceptual expectations based on associative context are
less fixed than previously thought and remain plastic even
in later life. The plasticity of perceptual expectations has
been further corroborated by studies showing that repeated
exposure to fixed cue-stimulus associations induces long-lasting
perceptual changes in the perception of ambiguous stimuli
(Sinha and Poggio, 1996; Haijiang et al., 2006; Di Luca et al.,
2010). Here, we provide novel evidence demonstrating that
perceptual expectations about appearance can be updated
repeatedly and rapidly in accordance with changing cue-stimulus
associations, which unequivocally speaks to an ongoing learning
of perceptual expectations from associative context. Moreover,
our computational modeling analyses revealed that a continuous
update of prior probabilities based on associative learning
well accounts for participants’ perception, thereby providing
a mechanistic description of the observed ongoing learning
of perceptual expectations in terms of Bayesian learning and
inference. Remarkably, treating associative learning, priming,
and sensory memory as distinct, continuously updated priors
which are integrated with sensory information constituted
a plausible explanation of our participants’ behavior. Our
current results therefore illustrate how a generic Bayesian
framework for learning and inference can explain the
integration of different dynamic sources of information into
perception.
We conclude that perceptual expectations that determine
the contents of conscious perception flexibly capture various
changing aspects of experience, indicating that the construction
of our visual experience is a highly adaptive process ideally suited
to deal with the volatile nature of the sensory environment in a
probabilistic manner.
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